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ABSTRACT 
This paper employs a new dataset of 36 EU and OECD countries for the period 1961–
2012 to test the importance of economic inequality in banking crises and to find new 
determinants of them. We estimated a panel logit model with population-averaged 
results, capturing the most relevant crisis determinants in the literature. By analyzing 
the impact of inequality on the risk of a banking crisis, we found a new transmission 
channel of inequality to a financial recession via deficit and obtained a significant and 
robust positive impact of inequality on the bank crisis probability. We also found 
evidence that distance to USA, France and Japan decreases the likelihood of a financial 
crisis. Finally, and contrary to the theory, we found a new determinant that increases the 
likelihood of a crisis: the accumulated experience of VAT. 
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1. Introduction 
Many papers have analyzed theoretically the post-Keynesian view that considers the 
influence of inequality on financial crises (Claessens and Perotti, 2007; Rajan, 2010; 
Kumhof and Rancière, 2011; inter alia), but none of them have tested the impact of 
inequality as a determinant of banking crises using a multivariate logit model. 
Regarding the link between inequality and banking crises, Morelli and Atkinson (2015) 
state that “the overall evidence is far from being conclusive and there are several 
reasons to shed further light on this important research topic”. As far as we are aware, 
this is the first paper to apply this methodology to test the influence of inequality on 
financial crises. The multivariate logit model has been used in the literature to test the 
post-Keynesian view and to find new determinants of the probability of a financial 
crisis. We also use that methodology to explain determinants and transmission channels 
of a crisis. 
In this paper we aim to shed new light on the topic. To further our knowledge, we 
employ a new dataset of 36 EU and OECD countries for the period 1961–2012 to study 
the importance of inequality on banking crises and its determinants. We estimated a 
panel logit probability model with population-averaged results, capturing the most 
relevant crisis determinants in the literature. We analyzed the impact of economic 
inequality on the risk of a banking crisis, studying new transmission channels of 
inequality to a financial recession. We also used a geographical distance variable 
different from those used before and tested the importance of the Value Added Tax 
(VAT) experience as a new determinant of the likelihood of a banking crunch. A high 
explanatory model of banking crises is achieved. We found a significant and robust 
impact of inequality and the new variable variant of distance on the bank crisis 
probability. Inequality increases the likelihood of a crisis, and the distance variable 
decreases this risk. We also found a new channel of inequality interaction affecting the 
probability of a banking crisis. Finally, we found that the VAT experience is also a 
significant and robust factor that increases the financial crunch risk. 
The paper is divided into six sections. The second section contains the literature review 
of the topic and the third explains data and methodology, using a multivariate logit 
panel data model. The empirical results are provided in the fourth section. The main 
results are the corroboration of the post-Keynesian view by a significant and robust 
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positive impact of inequality on the likelihood of a banking crisis, the presence of a 
transmission channel of inequality to the banking crunch via deficit, and the robust and 
significant influence of VAT experience on the dependent variable. We also observed 
that it is not only the geographical distance from the United States (USA) that reduces 
the likelihood of a financial crisis, as Ye and Han (2010) show, but also the 
geographical distance from the sum of the bilateral distances to the USA, Japan and 
France. The fifth section discusses the results and, finally, the sixth section provides 
conclusions and final remarks. 
 
2. Literature review 
Recently, several studies have aimed to explain banking crises. Boudriga and 
Ghardallou (2012) provide a good review of the literature of banking crisis 
determinants. Gavin and Haussmann (1996) provide theoretically a seminal study of the 
main factors that trigger a banking crisis, related to liberalization, banking competition, 
regulation of deposit interests, information, macroeconomic volatility, capital assets 
ratio, bank liquidity, monetary policy and lending booms. 
A relevant analysis of banking crises is carried out by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998). They estimate the probability of banking crises using a multivariate logit model. 
To capture adverse macroeconomic shocks, they use the rate of growth of real GDP, the 
external terms of trade and the real short-term interest rate. High short-term real interest 
rates affect bank balance sheets adversely if banks cannot increase their lending rates 
quickly enough. Financial liberalization may increase banking sector fragility since risk 
taking and fraud are more likely. They introduce the ratio of credit to the private sector 
to GDP to capture financial liberalization, in addition to the real interest rate. Another 
proxy they use is lags of the change in real credit. Inflation is introduced as a 
measurement for macroeconomic mismanagement. Furthermore, the rate of depreciation 
of the exchange rate is used to test if bank crises are driven by excessive foreign risk 
exposure. In addition, they introduce the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves as a 
predictor of balance of payment crises. Government surplus as a percentage of GDP is 
used to capture the financial needs of the public administration. They provide two 
reasons: first, a high surplus involves postponing measures to strengthen bank balance 
sheets, and second, a failure to control the budget deficit is an impediment to successful 
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financial liberalization, which creates problems for banks. The last relevant variable is 
the ratio of bank cash and reserves to bank assets.  
Other studies that incorporate new variables, such as Beck et al. (2006), find that bank 
concentration increases banking crisis probability. Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999) also 
include consumption and investment variables. They find that a consumption boom in 
the years prior to a crisis can be a good indicator of banking crises. These authors state 
that “banking crises are associated with a sharp decline in the real effective exchange 
rate, but an appreciation in this rate often precedes a crisis”. The arguments they give 
are that adverse terms of trade shock and a real exchange rate appreciation affect the 
competitiveness of the economy and lead to a deterioration in the profitability of the 
corporate sector. The correction of that phenomenon by a depreciation of the exchange 
rate leads to losses for corporations indebted in foreign currency. 
Rose and Spiegel (2009) include exports GDP ratio as a factor of a financial crisis, but 
without strong evidence. Büyükkarabacak and Valev (2010) differentiate private credit 
from household and enterprise credit. Ye and Han (2010) show that financial contagion 
decreases with geographical distance from the United States, which was the center of 
the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis, and that the closer the distance to that center, the 
greater the effect. Boudriga and Ghardallou (2012) find that deterioration in 
competitiveness is associated with an increased risk of problems in the banking sector.  
The importance of inequality on banking crises has been theoretically explained by 
Claessens and Perotti (2007), Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and Rancière (2011) who 
propose that an increment in inequality led to a credit boom and finally to a financial 
crisis in the USA at the beginning of the 21
st
 century as it did in the 1920s. Atkinson 
and Morelli (2011) find that income inequality and banking crises seem not to be linked. 
The results of Bordo and Meissner (2012) also suggest there is no significant 
relationship between inequality and credit booms. Stockhammer (2013), based on post-
Keynesian theory, identifies channels by which inequality has contributed to crises
1
.  
Finally, the literature that relates the experience of VAT with a financial crisis (Gale 
and Harris, 2011) states that VAT leads to a deficit reduction, and these authors affirm, 
                                                          
1
 First, an increase in inequality leads to a decrement in aggregate demand since poorer countries have 
high propensities to consume. Second, international financial deregulation leads to larger current account 
deficits and for a longer period. Third, rising inequality leads to a higher household debt. Fourth, higher 
inequality raises the propensity to speculate and, therefore, risk taking and the probability of a crisis. 
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based on Burman et al. (2010) and others, that “investors’ fears about future deficits can 
reach a tipping point and trigger a financial crisis”.  
3. Data sample and methodology 
We aim to explain the variable crisis. Our dependent variable, crisis, is available in the 
World Bank and represents a dummy variable that equals one if the country is 
experiencing a banking crisis and zero if it is not. We estimated the equations using a 
population-averaged panel logit probability model, as Büyükkarabacak and Valev did 
(2010)
2
.  
  * *logit Pr 1|it it itY X X          [1] 
Where itY  represents the dependent variable crisis, itX the explanatory variables, 
*  the 
change in the logit of the proportion with 1Y   for an increase in X  of a unit and *  is 
the constant.  
The main advantage of the population-averaged method to the others is that it allows us 
to use the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance. This estimator reduces the 
impact of outliers and generates valid standard errors. Robust standard errors are 
obtained by the generalized estimating equations (GEE) method. 
Table 1. Countries and years in the sample. 
Years: 52 Countries: 36 
1961-2012 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Latvia, 
Mexico, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States. 
 
The explanatory variables used in this paper are the main determinants of banking crises 
that do not present multicollinearity problems, in addition to our objective variables. 
The main determinants of financial crises used in this paper are: gdppc, which is the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita variation rate; terms, measured as the 
                                                          
2
 As these authors state, for a detailed description of the population-averaged model, see Zeger et al. 
(1988), Neuhuas et al. (1991), and Wooldridge (2002). We also estimated our equations using a random 
effects logit model. Our estimated coefficients are similar to those of the population-averaged model. 
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capacity to import fewer exports of goods and services in constant prices; lnc2, the real 
growth of domestic credit lagged two periods; exch, official exchange rate (national 
currency unity per US$, average for a period); surplus, public cash surplus or deficit is 
revenue (including grants) minus expense, minus net acquisition of nonfinancial assets; 
liquid, which is measured by the share of liquid bank reserves in total bank assets; 
lerner, which is the Lerner index, a measurement of banking competition that compares 
output pricing and marginal costs (that is, the markup) in the banking market: an 
increase in the Lerner index indicates a deterioration in the competitive conduct of 
financial intermediaries; infl, which is inflation, measured as the annual variation of the 
cost of a shopping basket for a customer
3
. Tables 1 and 2 show the main characteristics 
of the variables. 
Table 2. Summary statistics. 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
crisis 1,872 0.40385 0.49080 0.00000 1.00000 
gdppc 1,587 2.65145 3.62974 -31.17752 17.55749 
terms 1,527 7.04E+11 6.09E+12 -3.58E+13 6.97E+13 
lnc2 1,485 24.92688 2.34787 18.61231 31.19756 
exch 1,489 87.25574 237.40600 0.00001 1,909.43900 
surplus 575 -1.54559 4.35130 -29.42016 20.00958 
liquid 425 7.83940 9.14341 0.22961 60.94282 
lerner 535 0.18510 0.11775 -1.60869 0.50311 
infl 1,518 11.16206 39.33546 -4.47994 1,058.37400 
exp 1800 9.265556 11.61388 0 44 
dist 1,872 9.84431 0.24965 9.65257 10.67034 
gini2 428 29.43027 10.21554 0.28300 56.21000 
 
Our objective variables are gini2, which is the Gini index lagged two periods, 
measuring the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, 
consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates 
from a perfectly equal distribution; surplusgini2, which represents interaction of the 
variables surplus and gini2, used in the robustness check; and dist, which is the 
logarithm of the aggregated bilateral distance of a country to the USA, France and 
                                                          
3
 Other variables were used as the ratio of M2 (monetary mass) to the total of reserves (including gold, 
US$ in current prices), or financial depth, but these variables present multicollinearity problems and were 
eliminated from the model.  
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Japan. The variable exp reflects the VAT experience of a country lagged two years, 
which is the accumulation of years since a country adopted VAT. 
We lagged the real growth of domestic credit (Beck et al., 2006), the VAT experience 
and the measure of inequality (the Gini coefficient) for two periods, to minimize 
simultaneity problems (Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010). Data were obtained from the 
World Bank Database, except gini2, which the author obtained from Eurostat and 
OECD Database, exp, obtained from different sources, and distance, obtained from the 
GeoDist Database (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). 
In Table 3 we can see the expected sign of the coefficients of our variables, based on the 
arguments in section 1. The variable surplusgini2 shows a new transmission channel of 
the effect of inequality on a banking crisis: we supposed that a higher inequality leads to 
a higher deficit to the government, due to redistribution policies. This higher deficit 
influences positively on the probability of a financial crisis, due to the crowding out 
effect on the finance of enterprises. Consequently, we expected a negative sign of the 
variable. 
Panel data were used, specifically, an unbalanced panel from the year 1961 to 2012 
from 36 countries, all the EU (27) and OECD countries with the exceptions of 
Switzerland, Cyprus, Romania and Malta. Tables 1 and 2 give some basic information 
about data and variables. 
Table 3. Expected signs of the variable coefficients. 
Variable Sign Variable Sign Variable Sign 
gdppc - surplus - exp - 
terms + liquid + dist - 
lnc2 + lerner - gini2 + 
exch + infl + surplusgini2 - 
 
Correlations among independent variables used in the model are shown in Table 4. 
Variables with a high correlation were not included in the models and hence, in the 
matrix. Some variables were omitted due to a high correlation with other variables. 
Avoiding these variables, the highest correlation is the correlation between lnc2 and 
liquid, with a value of 0.48. This correlation is below 0.5, so it can be said that there are 
no multicollinearity problems.  
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Table 4. Correlation matrix of independent variables. 
 
gdppc terms lnc2 exch surplus liquid lerner infl cons dist gini2 
gdppc 1 
       
   
terms 0.09 1 
      
   
lnc2 -0.44 -0.24 1 
     
   
exch -0.01 -0.38 0.08 1 
    
   
surplus 0.27 0.05 -0.11 0.02 1 
   
   
liquid 0.27 0.07 -0.48 0.10 -0.21 1 
  
   
lerner 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.28 -0.13 1 
 
   
infl 0.21 0.09 -0.40 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.06 1    
exp -0.21 -0.11 0.06 0.18 0.34 -0.24 -0.01 -0.19 1   
dist -0.06 -0.18 0.19 0.17 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 -0.26 1  
gini2 0.06 -0.06 -0.09 0.01 -0.35 0.06 0.19 0.15 -0.05 0.18 1 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
The main findings of the paper are summarized in Tables 5 and 6, which show the 
effects of the variables on the likelihood of a banking crisis.  
Table 5. Estimated models (a). 
Dependent 
variable: lnloan 
(I) Complete model “a” (II) Definitive model “a” (III) Check model “a” 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
gdppc -0.295** 0.04 -0.138 0.136 -0.181* 0.096 
terms -2.51E-13* 0.076         
lnc2 3.918*** 0.002 2.041* 0.053 1.728** 0.03 
ex 0.039*** 0.003 0.021** 0.023 0.015** 0.041 
surplus 3.700** 0.011 2.020*** 0.008 -0.142 0.626 
liquid 0.384*** 0.002 0.195** 0.04 0.164** 0.031 
lerner -51.983*** 0.001 -30.127** 0.026 -22.07*** 0 
infl 0.845*** 0.001 0.441* 0.058 0.240 0.185 
dist -211.931*** 0.003 -113.882** 0.019 -88.233** 0.03 
gini2 0.457*** 0 0.306*** 0 0.319 0.025 
surplusgini2 -0.134** 0.02 -0.071** 0.01     
constant 1946.953*** 0.003 1046.545** 0.018 804.677** 0.032 
No observations 106 107 107 
Wald No data 2046.04 348 
Wald p-value No data 0 0 
* Significance level of 10%, ** significance level of 5%, *** significance level of 1%. 
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The models were estimated following the population-averaged panel logit probability 
model and using robust standard errors obtained by the generalized estimating equations 
(GEE) method, as we stated in section 2.  
Table 6. Estimated models (b). 
Dependent 
variable: lnloan 
(IV) Complete model “b” (V) Definitive model “b” (VI) Check model “b” 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
gdppc -0.284** 0.043         
terms -1.91E-13 0.244         
lnc2 3.649*** 0.002 1.807* 0.075 1.487** 0.022 
ex 0.032* 0.073 0.011** 0.011 0.006** 0.033 
surplus 3.688*** 0.01 2.078** 0.027 -0.243 0.404 
liquid 0.368*** 0.002 0.177* 0.074 0.147* 0.053 
lerner -49.48*** 0 -28.107* 0.07 -20.293*** 0.004 
infl 0.833*** 0 0.453 0.127 0.259* 0.086 
exp 0.068 0.677 0.140* 0.07 0.123* 0.073 
dist -179.443* 0.066 -63.160*** 0.004 -50.398*** 0.004 
gini2 0.425*** 0.001 0.240*** 0 0.346* 0.064 
surplusgini2 -0.134** 0.017 -0.076** 0.028     
constant 1636.975* 0.075 557.216*** 0.003 438.696*** 0.006 
No 
observations 
106 107 107 
Wald No data 2011.6 91.25 
Wald p-value No data 0 0 
* Significance level of 10%, ** significance level of 5%, *** significance level of 1%. 
 
Models (II) and (V) are the definitive logit models estimated, and they have good 
econometric properties, as joint significance of the parameters, based on a p-value of the 
Wald test that equals to zero. Models (III) and (VI) are the robustness check models, 
which also have good statistical properties. Models (I) and (IV) are the complete 
models, which use all the financial crisis determinants in the literature that do not suffer 
multicollinearity problems but the econometric properties are not available. 
In models “a”, we tested the post-Keynesian thesis that inequality increases the risk of a 
banking crisis, we incorporated our new determinant dist, and we found a new 
transmission channel that triggers a banking crisis, all in an explanatory model of 
financial crisis. Model (II) was estimated on the base of model (I), consecutively 
eliminating non-significant variables to obtain a simpler and more explanatory model, 
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and keeping interest variables in the successive estimations. Model (III) conducted a 
robustness test for gini2 and dist by eliminating the variable surplusgini2. 
Models “b” incorporated another new determinant of the banking crisis, the VAT 
experience (exp). Model (IV) was similar to model (I), with the exception of the 
incorporation of variable exp. The methodology of models “b” was also similar to 
models “a”, with the difference that the check model (VI) analyzed the robustness of the 
results of model (V), but with model (V) we can also test the robustness of the variable 
surplusgini2, thanks to model (II) and the variable exp. 
 
5. Discussion 
Definitive models (II) and (V) and check models (III) and (VI) are used to interpret the 
results. A significant and robust positive influence of inequality, measured by the Gini 
index, on the banking crisis risk can be observed. This result confirms the expectations 
of Stockhammer (2013) and others that developed the idea of a positive impact of 
economic inequality on financial crises, corroborating the post-Keynesian theory. 
Furthermore, model (II) shows an expansion mechanism of the inequality effect to 
trigger a banking crisis, which is robust with model (V). The channel is via deficit 
(measured as surplus): interaction between inequality and surplus leads to a reduction in 
the risk of a banking crisis. This means that a country with high inequality has a higher 
probability of falling into a crisis when the government has a public deficit than in other 
cases. This can be interpreted using the following arguments: a country with high 
inequality will need more public expenditure in the future, and having a high deficit in 
the present means that public debt increases will be more likely in the future. 
Consequently, this increment in public debt will lead to a crowding out effect (a 
contraction of available credit for private enterprises due to the expansion of public 
debt, achieving a lower capacity of investment in the country). This effect and the 
increment in the risk of a public default would probably trigger a banking crisis. 
As we can see, comparing models (II) and (III) and remembering that model (III) 
includes the effect of surplus without surplusgini2, the results shows a negative relation 
between surplus and the probability of a crisis, as the theory predicted (model III), 
although it is not statically significant. Taking into account the above-mentioned 
transmission channel (model II), the surplus has a positive and significant impact on the 
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likelihood of a banking crisis. This can be interpreted by stating that in countries 
without or with less inequality, an increment in deficit benefits the banking system 
because it encourages the expansion of the economy and there is no or less risk of a 
default than in a higher inequality country. The overall surplus effect, considering both 
kinds of countries, reduces the banking crisis risk, but results in non-significant effect.  
The third main contribution of this paper is the fact that not only does the geographical 
distance to the USA reduce the probability of a crisis, but the distance to other 
developed countries, such as France and Japan, also dispels the risk of a banking 
crunch. All the other variables appearing in these models have the expected sign, and all 
of them are significant and robust with the exceptions of GDP per capita growth and 
inflation. 
The fourth and last contribution is the consideration of VAT experience as a new 
determinant of banking crises. Furthermore, in contradiction of theory expectations, we 
find that this variable increases the probability of a crisis (model V), being a robust 
result (model VI). We argue that this sign is positive because a country with more 
experience in VAT is also an economy more open to trade (Desai and Hines, 2005), 
and, consequently, a country more exposed to financial shocks.  
Other relevant variables with a robust and significant effect with the expected sign on 
the likelihood of a financial crisis are: lending growth lagged two years, with a positive 
impact as mentioned by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Hardy and 
Pazarbasioglu (1999) and Boudriga and Ghardallou (2012); the exchange rate with a 
positive sign (that is, the depreciation of the national currency is associated with a 
banking crisis in the current period), as Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and 
Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999) found; the banks’ liquidity with a positive effect, as 
mentioned by Boudriga and Ghardallou (2012); and the lack of banking competition, 
with a negative sign as Gavin and Haussmann (1996) predicted. 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
This paper provides further evidence on banking crises determinants. We analyzed the 
impact of inequality on banking crunches, studied transmission channels of inequality to 
financial crises, empirically tested the impact of the VAT experience as a new banking 
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crisis determinant and measured the influence of geographical distance to developed 
countries on the risk of a banking crisis. 
Using a large sample of countries, we found a robust significance of the positive 
influence of inequality on banking crises, corroborating previous theoretical frameworks 
and arguments. We observed a transmission channel of inequality to financial crises via 
deficit. A negative significant and robust effect of the interaction between public surplus 
and inequality was obtained. Taking into account this transmission channel, the surplus 
has a positive, robust and significant impact on the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
Compared with the literature, we obtained a significant, robust and positive influence of 
the VAT experience on the probability of a crisis. Finally, we also found that 
geographical distance to developed countries in general (France, Japan and the USA), 
not only the USA, leads to a reduction in the risk of a financial crunch. 
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